How does the household structure shape the urban economy? by Tscharaktschiew, Stefan & Hirte, Georg
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Tscharaktschiew, Stefan; Hirte, Georg
Working Paper
How does the household structure
shape the urban economy?
Dresden discussion paper series in economics, No. 07/09
Provided in cooperation with:
Technische Universität Dresden
Suggested citation: Tscharaktschiew, Stefan; Hirte, Georg (2009) : How does the household
structure shape the urban economy?, Dresden discussion paper series in economics, No.
07/09, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/36500TU Dresden 







 Dresden Discussion Paper Series  







How does the household structure shape  


























ISSN 0945-4829  




Dresden University of Technology 
Institute of Transport & Economics 








Dresden University of Technology 
Institute of Transport & Economics 























Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics 
 
Internet: 
An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded from the homepage: 
http://rcswww.urz.tu-dresden.de/wpeconomics/index.htm 




Working paper coordinator: 
 
Dominik Maltritz 
e-mail: wpeconomics@mailbox.tu-dresden.de  
 
 








How does the household structure shape  




  Stefan Tscharaktschiew  Georg Hirte 
  Dresden University of Technology  Dresden University of Technology   
  Institute of Transport & Economics  Institute of Transport & Economics 
  01062 Dresden  01062 Dresden 







Households in real cities are heterogeneous regarding their size and composition. This implies that the household 
structure - i.e. the (average) household size, the composition, the relative share of different household types, and the 
number of households - differs across cities. This aspect is usually neglected in urban models used to study economic 
and policy issues that arise in today's cities. Furthermore, the household structure might change over time. For instance, 
over the last decades average household size has decreased in many countries. Several implications of this change have 
been discussed, but usually not in regard to an urban economy with its interdependencies. We develop an applied urban 
general equilibrium model which explicitly takes the household structure into account and thus allows studying the 
impacts of changes in the household structure on an urban economy and its spatial pattern. The paper shows that 
changes in the household structure affect an urban economy in various ways and may contribute to explain economic 
and spatial effects on cities. Compared to a 'Base City' which reflects the actual household structure in the United 
States, urban labor force participation, housing demand, rents, wages as well as urban commuting and shopping 
patterns are considerably affected by, e.g., changes in the average household size in a city. For instance, wage 
inequality between differently skilled workers rises and extreme cross commuting drops to almost zero when the city 
turns into a pure 'Singles City'. 
 
 
JEL-Classification: C 68; R12; R13; R14; R20 
 




The household is the fundamental basic economic unit in the society. But the structure
of households varies across cities because households are heterogeneous and di⁄er in size
as well as their composition. Furthermore, the household structure ￿ i.e. the (average)
household size, the composition, the relative share of di⁄erent household types, and the
number of households ￿changes over time. For instance, in many countries households have
become smaller in recent decades. Between 1970 and 2000, the average number of persons
in households in less developed countries fell from 5.1 to 4.4. In more developed nations,
it decreased from 3.2 to 2.5 persons per household over the same period (Keilman, 2003).
Figure 1 shows the development in the United States.









































Figure 1: Average household size in the United States (1960 - 2007) and some cities (2000)
In the U.S. the level of the average number of persons in households declined to 2.57 (2007),
whereas total population and thus the number of households grew. Furthermore, the av-
erage household size di⁄ers considerably across cities (see for instance the year 2000). The
development is similar in countries of the European Union, as shown in Table 1.
2Table 1: Average household size in countries and cities of the European Union
Average household size
Country 1982 2002 City 2004
UK 2.7 2.3 Manchester 2.24
Germany 2.5 2.2 Berlin 1.80
Italy 3.0 2.6 Milan 1.95
Spain 3.6 3.0 Barcelona 2.50
Finland 2.3 1.9 Helsinki 1.88
Source: European Commission - Living conditions in Europe (2003); Eurostat - Urban Audit (2009)
For example in Germany, the average number of persons per household fell from 2.5 in 1982
to 2.2 in 2002 for the whole country, whereas the number of households increased in the
same period. Taking into account only the city of Berlin, the average number of persons
in households is only 1.8. In addition, in the U.S. the growth in single-parent and single-
person households has increased the share of adults in all age groups heading independent
households. For instance, 26% of all households consisted of a person living alone in 2006,
up from 17% in 1970 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2007a). What do these changes in the household
structure imply for an urban economy? This is the issue we explore in this paper.
A di⁄erentiated understanding of the interplay between the household structure and the
city is important from an urban economic perspective because the number of households
located in urban areas is expected to increase over the next decades (United Nations, 2008).
Therefore, e⁄ects of di⁄erences and changes in the household structure mainly arise on the
level of cities, such as changes in rents, locations, commuting and shopping patterns with
all its consequences. In the literature, there are several e⁄ects that have been discussed, but
usually not in regard to an urban economy with its miscellaneous interdependencies, such as
the interactions between di⁄erent markets (products, labor, land), households and ￿rms.
On the one hand, an increase in the number of households rises the demand for housing
units. On the other hand, smaller households are less e¢ cient concerning the per capita
use of resources, because goods and services are shared by more people in larger households.
3Thus, even when the population remains constant, a higher share of small households induces
a larger demand for resources. In other words, the prevailing trend towards a smaller average
household size means that economies of scale are being lost. As Ironmonger et al. (1995)
suggest, energy use and expenditures per adult decrease with an increase in household size.
Thus, economies of scale arise with respect to the number of persons per household. Con-
cerning this matter, a similar result is found by Nelson (1988), who empirically determined
economies of scale in housing. Logan (2008) provides evidence that increases in household
size are correlated with decreases in the share of expenditure devoted to housing. That is, if
two adults unite to form one household, they will be better o⁄as they can share a household
internal public good such as housing. In addition, many taxation schemes treat single-persons
and larger households di⁄erently. Therefore, to examine, for instance, the impact of income
taxation on an urban economy, it is necessary to incorporate a more complex and hetero-
geneous household structure. Other examples are the e⁄ects of the household structure on
urban labor force participation, gender issues and public transport. But heterogeneity in
the household structure is usually neglected in the literature. Most urban models used to
study economic and policy issues that arise in today￿ s cities focus almost entirely on di⁄erent
consumer types, for example rich and poor persons, but not on di⁄erences in the household
structure, i.g. the number of equally or di⁄erently skilled working household members.
There are only a few urban models taking into account a more complex household structure.
For instance, models used to examine the more complex process of location decision concern-
ing households with two working members were developed by Curran et al. (1982) and White
(1977). But these models ignore the interactions between di⁄erent markets, households and
￿rms in the city. Another model which incorporates a more complex household structure was
developed by Hotchkiss and White (1993). However, they also do not consider the produc-
tion sector of the urban economy. Hence, shopping trips required to buy the consumption
goods in the city are ignored. But shopping trips are an important aspect when considering
di⁄erent household types. Imagine a household with two working members. Assume there is
a wage di⁄erential among the household members. Then, the value of time of both household
4members can di⁄er implying di⁄erences in full economic shopping costs, i.e. monetary costs
plus opportunity costs of travel time. As a consequence, the heterogeneous household can
bene￿t from internal division of shopping activities. Hence, full economic shopping costs
of a two-worker household may di⁄er from those of two identical single-worker households,
resulting in economies scale in shopping. This might a⁄ect its location decision. A similar
conclusion occurs with regard to full economic commuting costs. Because workers optimally
choose their number of daily working hours in the model of Hotchkiss and White, commuting
costs remain una⁄ected as long as there is a minimum fraction of working hours supplied
per day. As a result, changes in commuting costs only occur if the number of working hours
supplied per day fall to zero and, hence, commuting costs drop to zero. Thus, in their model
gains from an optimal internal division of labor in a two-worker household cannot arise with
respect to commuting. In contrast, because of the complementarity of working days and
full economic commuting costs (excepting for telecommuting), such gains could be realized
when workers are allowed to choose their supply of working days. Furthermore, their model
treats wages as exogenously given. This means, a more complex income taxation scheme
that treats di⁄erent households di⁄erently cannot be considered, because income taxation
in￿ uences labor decisions and thus wages in the city. Aside from these issues, their model
does not incorporate non-working households, although in reality the share of non-working
households is substantial, as Table 2 shows.
Table 2: Number of workers per household in the United States 2007




3 or more workers 6
Source: U.S. Census Bureau
To explore the impact of changes in the household structure on an urban economy, we mod-
ify the urban general equilibrium model of Anas and Xu (1999) or Anas and Rhee (2006)
5in various ways. The most important innovation is the di⁄erentiated household structure
we implement. This allows to examine, to our knowledge for the ￿rst time within an urban
general equilibrium framework, the impact of di⁄erences in the household structure on an
urban economy and its spatial pattern. The model treats the interactions of product, labor
and land markets as well as linkages between ￿rms and di⁄erent consumer types living in
di⁄erent household types. Households di⁄er not only in endowments and preferences, but
also in size and in the composition regarding their members. Referring to real-world observa-
tions, we implement the following consumer and household types: non-working single-person
households and non-working two-person households, i.e. non-working couples; low-skilled and
high-skilled single-worker households; low-skilled and high-skilled homogeneous two-worker
households each composed of two potentially employed adults each with the same skill level;
and heterogeneous two-worker households each composed of one potentially employed adult
with a lower skill level and one potentially employed adult with a higher skill level.1
The persons are potentially employed because the work decision is endogenous in the model
and, as we will see later, depends also on the household type the persons belong to. House-
holds decide where to reside, where to work (if working), where and how much to shop, how
much labor to supply and how much land to rent in the urban area bearing in mind full
economic travel costs. The labor supply decision concerns the choice of the number of work-
ing days, so potential savings of full economic commuting costs in two-worker households
can arise. All prices, i.e. commodity prices, wages, rents, as well as location decisions are
determined endogenously in the model. Since households can vary in idiosyncratic tastes for
locations within the urban area, decisions of households create mixed land use and various
possible commuting patterns, a result which is commonly observed in real cities. The crucial
aspect in the case of homogeneous as well as heterogeneous two-worker households is that
their household members make a joint decision regarding the residential location and the
potential work location of both members. These decisions are interdependent in real decision
1Although Table 1 shows a small share of households composed of three or more workers, for simplicity, we
subsume such households to two-worker households.
6processes, as observed, for instance, by Freedman and Kern (1997) or Singell and Lillydahl
(1986) using empirical approaches. In addition, the members of these household types not
only have to decide where to shop in the urban area, but also who shall execute the shop-
ping trips. Hence, internal economies of scale in shopping can be realized by a two-worker
household compared to the usually assumed single-worker household. There are no prede-
termined residential or employment locations in the city, so the spatial pattern can exhibit
a polycentric structure. Making employment locations endogenous is important in order to
re￿ ect real-world land use patterns with a remarkable fraction of dispersed job locations (see
e.g. Anas et al., 1998; Center on Urban & Metropolitan Policy, 2001; Wheaton, 2004).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model. In Section 3 we describe the
model calibration and the results of the numerical ￿ Base City￿simulation which constitutes
our benchmark and re￿ ects the actual household structure in the U.S. In Section 4 we pro-
vide results and discuss the ￿ndings of the numerical simulations of changes in the household
structure. The paper shows that changes in the household structure contribute to explain
economic and spatial e⁄ects on cities. The main ￿ndings are that compared to the ￿ Base
City￿urban labor force participation, housing demand, rents, wages as well as commuting
and shopping patterns are considerably a⁄ected by changes in the household structure. For
instance, wage inequality between di⁄erently skilled workers increases and extreme cross com-
muting drops to almost zero when the city turns into a pure ￿ Singles City￿ . However, overall
commuting travel might even increase. Section 5 provides sensitivity analyses and Section 6
o⁄ers conclusions and some ideas of possible further model extensions and applications.
2 The model
2.1 The general setting
The urban area is partitioned into I zones. The zones are linked via an exogenously given
transport network with distance dij. At each zone i (i 2 I), a ￿xed land area Ai is available for
7the development of residences and establishments. The land area in each zone i homogeneous.
Hence, from the perspective of city residents and ￿rms, land within the same zone is identical
but land of di⁄erent zones is viewed as an imperfect substitute. At each zone i, the land rent
is endogenously determined2 and ￿rms produce a composite commodity using land and labor
supplied by high-skilled and low-skilled city residents. The zone speci￿c local markets for the
composite commodity and the production factors are competitive. Commodities produced
in di⁄erent zones are product varieties, hence, there is spatial product di⁄erentiation and
consumers have the opportunity to shop at di⁄erent locations in the city to satisfy their taste
for shopping variety.
Households with working members are di⁄erentiated in regard to the skill levels of their
members either as high-skilled, low-skilled or mixed-skilled, i.e. heterogeneous, households.
Household members are free to choose home zones (residence) and work zones (employment)
within the urban area. They derive utility from consumption of the spatially di⁄erentiated
commodities, housing and leisure. Household members might have to commute to work and
make shopping trips to the selling points of the commodities. In order to determine trip
distances and travel times, commuting and shopping trips are assumed to originate from the
center of a zone.
It is assumed that the urban economy is closed in the sense that the total population in the
urban area is ￿xed and exogenously given, that is there is no interurban migration and utility
levels of households are endogenously determined.3 Apart from this, the city is partly open
in the sense that some share of the urban production will be exported to balance rents paid
to absentee landowners and travel expenses which implicitly ￿ ow to an external transport
sector.
2One can imagine that the urban area has already reached its natural boundary or the urban area is sur-
rounded by land that is not convertible into urban land due to political restrictions. Hence, land rent at the
edge of the city can di⁄er from land rent beyond the city boundary.
3The assumption that no interurban migration occurs is appropriate if it is assumed that consequences arising
in the city, for instance based on policy or demographic changes, also a⁄ect the other cities in the (national)
economy.
82.2 Households
There are 4 di⁄erent household types y (y 2 Y ) in the urban economy: non-working house-
holds (y = 1), single-worker households (y = 2), homogeneous two-worker households (y = 3);
and heterogeneous two-worker households (y = 4). In addition, non-working households are
di⁄erentiated in regard to the number of household members, where g = 1 denotes a non-
working single household and g = 2 denotes a non-working couple household. Furthermore,
households with working members are di⁄erentiated according to their composition of skill
types h (h 2 H); where h = 1 denotes a lower skill level and h = 2 denotes a higher skill level.
That means, there are two di⁄erent non-working household types, two di⁄erent single-worker
household types, two di⁄erent homogeneous two-worker household types composed of two
employed persons each with the same skill level, and one heterogeneous (mixed) two-worker
household type composed of one employed lower-skilled person and one employed higher-
skilled person. Let N be the number of households belonging to a speci￿c household type,







In this paper we treat children in the households as dependents who do not cause any trip
purpose, e.g. trips to child care facilities or schools, or child related expenditures, e.g. ex-
penditures on child care or education.
Each household resides in some zone i. In the case of single-worker households, the household
member is employed in zone j (j 2 I): In the case of two-worker households, the ￿rst member
is employed in zone j while the second member is employed in zone l (l 2 I). Therefore,
the location choice set of non-working households is fig; the choice set of single-worker
households is fi;jg; and the choice set of two-worker households is fi;j;lg. This implies
commuting from residential location i to work zone j or l. Each household type has to pay
a rent ri per square meter of lot size for a residence in zone i. There are zone speci￿c local
markets for the composite commodity, land and di⁄erent labor skills. The latter implies
hourly wage rates wh
j or wh
l di⁄ering according to skill level h and work zone j or l. In
addition, since travel costs, travel time, rents and wages depend on the location choice set,
utility U of each household type also depends on either fig, fi;jg or fi;j;lg.
9In the next subsections we present the two-stage decision process of a typical, homogeneous
or heterogeneous, two-worker household with location choice set fi;j;lg. All other household
types face equivalent decision problems, depending on the speci￿c location choice set.4 In
the ￿rst stage, the household decides on consumption quantities, i.e. commodities, housing
and leisure, given its location choice set. In the second stage, the two-worker household
chooses its joint home location and the work locations of household members considering
deterministic utility levels associated with each location choice set as well as idiosyncratic
tastes re￿ ected by a stochastic utility component.
In the following, the lower indices are used to denote locations. The upper indices s (s 2 S),
where s = ffh;mhg, denote a speci￿c member of the household with skill level h 2 H. In
general, f is the ￿rst member in a two-worker household (or the only member in a single-
worker household) and m is the second member in a two-worker household. To simplify
notation, we only use f, m in the following.
2.2.1 Utility maximization
Using ￿ ￿ fi;j;lg, the random utility function of a typical two-worker household is
U￿ = u(Z￿;q￿;F￿) + ￿￿ = ￿lnZ￿ + ￿ lnq￿ + ￿ lnF￿ + "￿, (1)
where the deterministic part u(Z￿;q￿;F￿) is a Cobb-Douglas utility function on demand of
the composite commodity Z￿, lot size q￿ as a approximation for housing and aggregate leisure
F￿. The idiosyncratic taste constant "￿ presents the stochastic part of the random utility
function and varies among the households for each location choice set ￿.5
The shopping subutility function Z￿ for visiting di⁄erent shopping locations over a certain
4The full speci￿cation of the model including decisions of other household types can be found in Tscharak-
tschiew and Hirte (2009).
5One can imagine that households di⁄er in tastes for speci￿c attributes regarding the choice set ￿ and these
attributes are not observable by the researchers. Hence, they can determine only a choice probability of the
household￿ s decision on ￿.






























The household members s residing at i, working at j or l, travel from zone i to every zone
k (k 2 I) to purchase the composite commodity zk produced there, taking into account full
economic shopping costs, i.e. the commodity price plus monetary travel cost and opportunity
cost of travel time. We assume that Z￿ is produced by shopping activities of both household
members. Each member s might be active in home production, i.e. collects an amount of each
of the product varieties to produce a share of the composite commodity. However, whether
both household members go shopping depends on the relation of individual full economic
shopping costs as well as on the elasticity of substitution. The constants ak, bk = 0 measure
the relative attractiveness of shopping location k to household member f and m compared
to other locations.
The constant elasticity of substitution 1=(1￿￿); ￿ < 1 re￿ ects spatial taste variety in shopping
(Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977). As ￿ ! 1, shopping locations and therefore goods sold at di⁄erent
zones are perfect substitutes. In this case the household members shop only at the zone
where full economic shopping costs are the lowest. As ￿ ! ￿1, the household members
prefer to shop at each zone where shopping is possible regardless of the commodity price,
travel costs and travel time of making such a trip. We assume that separate trips are made
to each production (shopping) zone, purchasing one unit of the local good per trip. Hence,
we ignore trip chaining.
Besides the fact that both household members value spatial variety in shopping, they have
a taste for an internal task sharing concerning shopping trips, re￿ ected by the elasticity of
substitution 1=(1 ￿ !), ! < 1. As ! ! 1, shopping trips within the household are perfect
substitutes, so the household member with the lower full economic shopping costs is making
all shopping in the respective zone. Hence, full economic shopping costs per capita in a
two-worker household can be lower compared to an identical single-worker household. This
11implies that the two-worker household might realize internal economies of scale in shopping.
As ! ! ￿1, there is an extreme taste to spread shopping trips over both household members
s, regardless of di⁄erences in full economic shopping costs.6
In addition, the household derives utility from lot size q￿ and leisure consumption ‘s
￿ of each












The constant elasticity of substitution between leisure of both household members is 1=(1￿￿),
￿ < 1 and re￿ ects the preference to spread leisure over both household members.
Assuming that travel cost and travel time per unit of distance are identical for each person


















￿ + R, (3)
where Pik = pk +cik is the full monetary consumer price including the price of the composite








daily wage of household member s working in zone ￿ 2 [j;l]. Ds
￿ is the number of working
days supplied by household member s. Travel costs are determined by multiplying distance
dij from zone i to zone j by travel cost per unit of distance c. The monetary budget states
that consumption expenditure including monetary shopping trip costs of both household
members plus joint housing expenditure equal disposable income. The latter is the sum of
wage income of both working members of the household plus non-working income R, i.e. rent
dividend income, minus aggregate commuting costs. L are exogenously given daily working
hours assumed to be constant for all working individuals.
6As usual, in reality the truth lies somewhere in the middle. Hence, ￿1 < ￿ < 1: One can imagine that in
some cases, the physical presence of a speci￿c household member s is necessary to buy a certain commodity
such that s buys the consumption good in zone k despite higher full economic shopping costs. Alternatively,
it is plausible to assume that, although household member s has higher full economic shopping costs, the
member s simply loves to do some shopping on its own.







￿ = E, 8s = f;m (4)








￿ is total travel






￿ is total travel time
per period of household member m. The two-way travel time for a shopping trip from i to
k is denoted by tik and the two-way commuting time is denoted by t
f
ij or tm
il , where travel
times do not depend on tra¢ c volume. Travel time is determined by dividing distance dij by
travel speed v. Total time endowment E can be allocated to work, leisure and travelling.
Maximizing household utility (1) subject to the monetary budget constraint (3) and the time




























ij￿￿ (L + tm
il )￿m




￿ is the marginal utility of time of household member s and ￿￿ is the marginal utility
of joint monetary household income.
The last equations are used to derive the value of time ￿
s




























The value of time, which is the e⁄ective hourly wage rate, decreases with an increase in
monetary travel cost and travel time. If monetary transport cost and/or travel time di⁄er
between the household members because of di⁄erent work locations, e⁄ective hourly wage
13rates can di⁄er even though gross wage rates paid by ￿rms are equal, as in a homogeneous
two-worker household. However, if j = l (work locations of both household members are
identical), the value of time does not di⁄er between the household members of a homogeneous
two-worker household, because gross wage rates earned by two equally skilled city workers
are the same.
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The value of time enters all prices, except for housing demand. A higher value of time rises the
relative price of consumption or leisure with respect to housing. Hence, ceteris paribus, high-
wage households demand relatively more housing and less consumption or leisure, i.e. they
supply more labor. The same occurs with respect to the division of activities within a two-
worker household. If the members are heterogeneous concerning their value of time, ceteris
paribus the household member with the higher value of time is doing less shopping trips and
consumes less leisure, hence, he is working more. With identical household members these
e⁄ects are absent, and the household cannot bene￿t from the internal division of working
or shopping activities.7 Concerning the location decision there are several opposite forces.
If rents decrease with distance from the center housing demand is a centrifugal force. In
contrast, commuting and shopping trip costs constitute a centripetal force, since a central
residential location reduces aggregate full economic travel costs of the household. Since
wages of high-skilled individuals are higher than those of low-skilled individuals, high-skilled
households demand more land and at the same time have a higher value of time. Hence,
both forces are stronger for high-skilled households. The net e⁄ect is a priori ambiguous.
7There is evidence that in many countries women earn less than men, even in the same jobs. This implies
that women work less hours or days and bear a larger share of shopping activities.
142.2.2 Location decision
Insertion of the demand functions which can be derived from the ￿rst-order conditions (5)
yields the complete indirect random utility function
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The household compares all location choice sets and chooses the most preferred combination
of locations, in other words, chooses the choice set ￿ which o⁄ers the highest utility given
optimized consumption, housing demand and leisure demand, as well as idiosyncratic tastes.
These are stochastically distributed among households within the two-worker household type
for each ￿. Hence, choices are described probabilistically and, as a consequence, a discrete
choice model can be applied to model this decision.




~ U￿ > ~ U~ ￿, 8 ~ ￿ 6= ￿
i
(8a)
= Prob[~ u￿ + "￿ > ~ u~ ￿ + "~ ￿, 8 ~ ￿ 6= ￿], (8b)
where ￿￿ is the probability that a randomly selected two-worker household prefers the location
choice set ￿. Assuming that each "￿ is i.i.d. Gumbel distributed with E["￿] = 0, variance ￿2 and






, the choice probabilities are given by the multinomial











The logit probabilities exhibit several desirable properties (Train, 2003). First, ￿￿ is between
zero and one, as required for a probability. Second, the choice probabilities for all alternatives
sum to one:
P
8(i;j;l) ￿ijl = 1: The denominator in (9) is simply the sum of the numerator
15over all location choice sets, which gives this summing-up property automatically.
Further, the dispersion parameter, ￿, is important (Anas, 1990). At one extreme, as ￿ ! 1
￿ ! 0, there is taste homogeneity since taste idiosyncrasies vanish and all households within
the two-worker household type choose identically. In this case, the ￿￿ corresponding to the
highest ~ u￿ approaches one and all others converge to zero. At the other extreme, as ￿ ! 0
￿ ! 1, there is in￿nite taste heterogeneity since idiosyncrasies swamp the deterministic
and systematic part of utility and two-worker households choose randomly (￿￿ = 1=I3).
The case of ￿nite ￿ has empirical validity and is in line with the hypothesis of wasteful
commuting (￿rst noted by Hamilton, 1982; for further studies see e.g. Small and Song, 1992;
Kim, 1995; Van Ommeren and Van der Straaten, 2005; Ng, 2008). In reality, many possible
commuting patterns can be observed (see e.g. Anas and Rhee, 2007; Glaeser et al., 2001).8
Such di⁄erentiated commuting patterns are explained by assuming idiosyncratic tastes, but
cannot be explained using the assumption of uniform tastes (which means ￿ = 1 or ￿ = 0).
Hence, if ￿ < 1; at equilibrium di⁄erent household types can choose the same location
choice set, as is observed in real cities.
2.3 Producers (￿rms)
Within each zone i competitive ￿rms in the input and output markets employ a Cobb￿ Douglas
production function that combines land and labor to produce a zone speci￿c composite
commodity. Each commodity is sold at the zone in which it is produced. Firms producing at
the same zone i are identical. To simplify matters we drop the zone index i: Let Mh be the
aggregate labor input of skill level h [hours/period] in i and let Q be the aggregate land input










8For example, commuters who live in the suburbs and work in central cities and commuters who live in
central cities and work in the suburbs (known as reverse commuting).
16where B is the productivity (scale-) parameter, ￿
h is the output elasticity with respect to
labor of skill level h, ￿ is the output elasticity with respect to land and
PH
h=1 ￿
h + ￿ = 1 8i:















h ￿ rQ (11)




h; p￿X=Q = r. (12)








since free entry in each zone insures that pro￿t maximizing ￿rms make zero economic
pro￿t in the competitive market. Hence, price equals marginal (and average) cost, where
C(wh8h;r;X) is the cost function of a typical ￿rm located in the city.
2.4 Equilibrium conditions
In addition to the utility and pro￿t maximization conditions, several other conditions are
necessary to close the model. At general equilibrium, the factor markets for land and labor
with respect to skill level h and the market for the locally produced composite commodity
must clear in each zone i. Furthermore, ￿rms in each zone must make zero economic pro￿ts.

































￿ + ~ Qi = Ai
. (14)
17The left-hand side is the sum of lot size demands of all households of all household types
residing in zone i and commuting to all zones plus land demands of all the ￿rms in zone i.
The right-hand side is the available developable land in zone i.









































if h = 1
if h = 2
.
The left-hand side is the supply of labor by all household members (household types 2-4)
working in zone i and the right-hand side is the demand for labor by all the ￿rms producing
and selling in zone i. Note that in the case of the heterogeneous two-worker household (Type
y = 4), only one household member supplies labor in a speci￿c labor market h:



























abci + EXi = ~ Xi
: (16)
The left-hand side is the quantity of the composite commodity purchased in zone i by all
household members of all household types y who live and work in all the zones in the urban
area plus the quantity of the composite commodity that must be exported to balance rents
paid to absentee landowners and travel expenses. It is assumed that the composite commodity
produced in a zone i can be exported at price pi at zero transport costs. Therefore, the










18where ATC are aggregate monetary travel costs paid by all city residents per period for two-
way shopping trips and two-way commuting, and ALRi = (1 ￿ ￿i)Airi is aggregate land
rent generated in zone i but not owned by households in the city with ￿i as the share of
rents generated in zone i and redistributed to the residents. Hence, ￿iAiri is the sum of
rent dividends generated in zone i and earned by all city residents. The local zone speci￿c
production not exported, Xi ￿ EXi, is consumed locally. It is assumed that an equal share
of aggregate monetary transport costs and aggregate land rent is distributed to zones.9
According to the conditions described above, the task is to ￿nd for each zone i land rents,
wages with respect to skill level h, commodity prices, ￿rm outputs, export quantities and,
based on it, the entire set of endogenous variables. Relative prices can be determined, but
the price level is arbitrary.10 We solve the optimization problems of all household types y
and the city ￿rms which yields utility maximizing demands and pro￿t maximizing factor
demands. Then, we substitute these solutions into the equilibrium conditions, solving them
simultaneously. The system (13)-(17) is non-linear and cannot be solved analytically. There-
fore we have to rely on numerical simulations and proceed with computational analysis.11
See for instance the complexity of the decision process of a typical two-worker household. In
order to ￿nd the optimal location pattern within the city, i.e. the joint residential location
in zone i, work zone j of household member f and work zone l of household member m, it is
necessary to compare i ￿ j ￿ l = I3 choice alternatives.
In the next sections we use the model to examine the long run e⁄ects of changes in the
9Note that if ￿i = 1 8i and ATC = 0; it follows that EXi = 0 for each zone.
10Testing the model we found the expected result that multiplying all prices by a constant factor remains all
aggregate values as well as the individual optimized household demands and factor demands of the ￿rms
unchanged.
11Under the parameter values and the city geography we describe in the next section, the algorithm that solves
for the general equilibrium ￿nds an equilibrium in 2-5 minutes (once starting values are set appropriately)
by means of an accurate iterative procedure using a pc with a 2.40 GHz processor. We have checked the
successful iterative solutions in order to ensure that all excess demands equal zero and that the monetary
and full economic budget constraints of all households as well as the time constraints of all household
members in the city and the zero pro￿t condition of all city ￿rms are met (generally with a small tolerance
of 10￿8%). In addition, we have explored the uniqueness of the equilibrium numerically. Using a broad
range of di⁄erent starting values, the solution algorithm converges to the same equilibrium under the same
city geography and parameters.
19household structure ￿particularly changes in the household size, the relative share of di⁄erent
household types, and the number of households ￿on an urban economy and its spatial pattern.
First, we describe the parameter values used to simulate a ￿ Base City￿which re￿ ects the actual
pattern of the household structure in the U.S. Then, we describe and discuss some properties
of the ￿ Base City￿ . After this, we compute the entire path of discrete changes in the household
structure. Starting with the ￿ Base City￿ , we show how the urban economy can change when
the city turns into a ￿ Singles City￿and a ￿ Couples City￿ , which are the extreme cases in the
simulations. However, we also determine intermediate developments.
3 Model calibration and the ￿ Base City￿
The city characteristics and the chosen parameters for all simulations are shown in Table 3.
The urban area is partitioned into 5 zones, where zone i = 3 is assumed to be the city center.
The area developable for residences and establishments, Ai, increases with distance from the
city center.
We assume that the number of households in the ￿ Base City￿is 1 million. Then we use
U.S. data (U.S. Census Bureau) to calculate the number of households within a speci￿c
household type y (see Table 2). Accordingly, there are 260,000 non-working households,
390,000 single-worker households and 350,000 two-worker households which is a share of
0.35 of all households. This corresponds to the share of all households with more than
two workers in the U.S. In addition, we assume that non-working households are equally
distributed among singles and larger households. Summing up, total (adult) city population is
1,480,000 while the labor force encompasses 1,090,000 city residents. Following the American
Community Survey (U.S. Census Bureau, 2007b) we de￿ne a percentage of 30 of the labor
force as high-skilled, referring to an educational attainment of a Bachelor degree or higher.
Hence, there are 327,000 higher-skilled and 763,000 lower-skilled working persons in the city.
Parameters of the utility functions are chosen to ￿t real-world observations. Since housing is
20Table 3: Calibrated values of parameters
City Geography
Distance Area Ai
dij [km] Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 Zone 4 Zone 5 [million m2]
Zone 1 4 9 18 27 36 65.0
Zone 2 9 2 9 18 27 30.0
Zone 3 18 9 1 9 18 15.0
Zone 4 27 18 9 2 9 30.0
Zone 5 36 27 18 9 4 65.0
Households (Consumers)
Total city population: 1,480,000 Non-working persons: 390,000
Low-skilled persons: 763,000 High-skilled persons: 327,000
Utility function SNW CNW SW 8h HoTW 8h HeTW
￿ (Consumption) 0.45 0.45 0.35 0.35 0.35
￿ (Housing) 0.20 0.17 0.20 0.17 0.17
￿ (Leisure) 0.35 0.38 0.45 0.48 0.48
￿ 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70
! - 0.95 - 0.95 0.95
￿ - 0.30 - 0.30 0.30
ak, bk 8k 1 1 1 1 1
L = 8 hours/day ￿ = 10 p3 = $125 c = 0:35 $/km v = 30 km/hour
E =3520 hours/year (220 operating days per year ￿ 16 hours per day)
Production (City ￿rms)
￿low￿skilled = 0:35 ￿high￿skilled = 0:45 ￿ = 0:2 B = 0:6
SW: Single-worker: SNW: Non-working single CNW: Non-working couple
Ho(e)TW: Homogeneous (Heterogeneous) two-worker
a public good within households, single households have higher expenditure shares of housing
compared to larger households, i.e. non-working couple and two-worker households. This
refers to results of several empirical studies founding that increases in household size are
correlated with decreases in the share of expenditure devoted to housing (see e.g. Nelson,
1988; Logan, 2008).
As Table 3 shows, we assume that leisure enters the utility function of non-working house-
holds. So even the members of non-working households take into account travel time for







i. The preference for leisure is assumed to be slightly higher in larger
households (non-working couple and two-worker households), re￿ ecting the intention that
both household members are more interested in spending time together. By setting ￿ = 0:70
we assume that there is some spatial taste variety in shopping. Furthermore, we choose
! = 0:95 so that shopping trips are imperfect substitutes within households. Equivalently,
leisure hours of both household members are also considered to be imperfect substitutes.
Hence, ￿ which represents the preference to spread leisure over both household members is
set at 0:3, following the assumption that both household members are interested in enjoying
some leisure.
The Travel cost rate is c = 0:35 $/km. This approximates the average cost of owning and
operating an automobile in the U.S. (U.S. Department of Transportation, 2007). Hence, we
ignore mode choice for the time being. Urban travel speed is assumed to be 30 km/hour for
each city resident.
It is assumed that the non-working household type is the only one that earns non-wage
income from land rents generated in the city. This implies the assumption that the non-
working households bene￿t from an increase in land rents (or su⁄er from decreasing land





redistributed to households of the non-working household type is 0.5 for each zone i: However,
since the number of households within subtype g (single or couple household) di⁄ers among
the simulation path, for instance N1;1 = 260;000 (SNW) and N2;1 = 0 (CNW) in a pure
￿ Singles City￿ , the individual share ￿
g;1
i is adjusted such that the per capita share is equal
in all simulations. According to the American Time Use Survey 2007 (U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, 2007), working time per day, L, is 8 hours. The dispersion parameter is set at
10 for all households. The output elasticity of ￿rms in the city is taken to be 0.45 with
respect to higher-skilled workers and 0.35 with respect to lower-skilled workers. Finally, to
ensure ￿ exible wages, rents and incomes, we set the commodity price at the city center as
12One can think of retired households earning capital income from shares in real-estate ￿rms, or non-working
landowners, or people receiving in￿ ation adjusted bene￿ts.
22the numeraire and choose a level such that reasonable results can be obtained. Using this
base calibration, we obtain the ￿ Base City￿ . The main results of the ￿ Base City￿equilibrium
simulation are shown in Table 4.
Table 4: Some results of the ￿ Base City￿simulation
Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 Zone 4 Zone 5















Price [$/unit] 108.72 116.99 125.00 116.99 108.72
Output/resident [units/year] 42.24 37.98 33.09 37.98 42.24














Location decision [% HH of HH-Typ y]
SNW 31.6 14.7 7.4 14.7 31.6



























HeTW 27.0 17.7 10.6 17.7 27.0
Income [$/year] Housing [lot size m2]
SNW 23,203 46 - 104















HeTW 54,015 - 55,414 115 - 255
The supply of developable land is inelastic in the urban area. It increases with distance from
the city center, i.e. zone 3. The central location is relatively attractive for households and
￿rms due to good accessibility. This is the reason why rents decline steeply with distance
23from the center. In contrast, the wage gradient is almost ￿ at since labor is very mobile.
Because commodity prices depend on both, rents and wages, the price gradient is steeper
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Figure 2: Land use pattern in the ￿ Base city￿
The prices a⁄ect and re￿ ect the land use pattern of ￿rms and households which is displayed
in Figure 2. Although production and selling take place everywhere in the city, land use
for production and selling is higher in the central district. Residential land use shows the
opposite pattern. In the suburbs, i.e. zones 1 and 5, 70 % of the developable land area is
allocated to housing. Nonetheless, land is used more intensely in the city center: population
density as well as employment density decrease with distance from the center as shown in
Figure 3. Here, gross residential (employment) density in zone i is measured as the ratio of
the number of residents (workers) in this zone to the developable total land area in that zone
i. Net residential (employment) density is measured as the ratio of the number of residents
(workers) in a zone i to the land in that zone i developed for residences (production/selling).
Net residential (employment) density falls from 2.0 residents (2.7 workers) per 100 m2 to 0.9
residents (1.1 workers) in the edge zones.
In the ￿ Base City￿average one-way commuting time per worker is about 23.5 minutes per
working day. This is close to average daily commuting time in the U.S. which is about
241 2 3 4 5
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Figure 3: Residential and employment density
24.3 minutes in 2003 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2005a). Average monetary commuting (shopping
trip) cost is $1315 per worker and year ($1104 per resident and year). Average full economic
commuting (shopping trip) cost is $2967 per worker and year ($2150 per resident and year).
When one considers di⁄erent household types, a more di⁄erentiated pattern emerges. For
instance, 48% of all households centrally located are singles compared to 52% of larger house-
holds.13 In general, working singles are able to lowering full economic commuting cost by
residing near their working place. Since they can work in each district there is no need to
live only in the center. Hence, single-worker households (SW) commute on average shorter
distances than other household types (see Table 5). In contrast, due to idiosyncratic tastes
work locations of household members of many two-worker households are located in di⁄er-
ent districts. Since these households are limited in their abilities to locate near both work
places, they face higher average commuting distances (see Table 5). Hence, on average the
attraction force of the work location is weaker and they choose more centralized locations.
Furthermore, the city center is even less attractive for non-working households. Since full
economic commuting costs do not in￿ uence their location decision, the centrifugal force of
13In the U.S., the share of larger households centrally located is higher in largely white metro areas (Center
on Urban & Metropolitan Policy, 2002). Non-family households, e.g. singles, were the fastest growing
household type in major metropolitan suburbs in the 1990s. So household types traditionally associated
with more central locations are becoming more common in suburbs.
25Table 5: Average two-way commuting distance in the ￿ Base City￿
Average two-way commuting distance [km]
















housing demand is more important and they prefer more decentralized locations. The per-
centage of non-working households living in the city center is lower compared to households
with working city residents (see Table 4). Interestingly, concerning single-worker and ho-
mogeneous two-worker households, average commuting distances of low-skilled workers are
lower compared to high-skilled workers. What are the reasons for the this? On the one hand,
the wage and thus the value of time of a low-skilled worker is lower. Therefore, the worker is
willing to accept longer commuting trips. On the other hand, income of a low-skilled worker
is lower. Hence, monetary commuting cost takes up a larger fraction of income, forcing the
worker to travel shorter distances.14 In our case the latter e⁄ect is dominant and the lower
income worker commutes shorter distances (for empirical evidence see e.g. Kim, 1995).
In addition, there are some major di⁄erences between homogeneous and heterogeneous two-
worker households.
In a homogeneous household, both working members face the same value of time. For this
reason, this household is not able to reduce aggregate full economic commuting cost by re-
locating. Rather, the household is indi⁄erent between all locations lying in between both
14In the ￿ Base City￿the low-skilled single-worker spends on average about 6.5% of income on commuting.
This is more compared to all the other workers in the city. In comparison, in the U.S. the median percentage
of personal income spent on commuting is 5.6 (U.S. Department of Transportation, 2003) with respect to
income group $15,000￿ $21,999. This income group is equivalent to the income group of the low-skilled
single-worker households in the ￿ Base City￿ . Furthermore, the high-skilled single-worker spends on average
about 3.9% of income ($38,024￿ $39,110, see Table 4) on commuting. In comparison, in the U.S. the median
percentage of personal income spent on commuting is 4.2 with respect to income group $30,000 to $40,999.
26working places. In addition, concerning the low-skilled household, aggregate monetary com-
muting costs take up a large fraction of joint income. Concerning the high-skilled household,
both household members value commuting time at a high rate. As a consequence, homoge-
neous two-worker households are more centrally located. Table 4 shows that the percentage
of the low-skilled homogeneous households living in the center is the highest, 11.6, followed
by the percentage of the high-skilled homogeneous households which is 11.2. In contrast, ag-
gregate full economic commuting costs of a heterogeneous household depend on its location.
This household comprises a high-skilled and a low-skilled worker. Since both face di⁄erent
wages and thus a di⁄erent value of time, the household can bene￿t from internal division of
labor. Its aggregate income increases if the high-wage member works more. As a consequence,
the low-wage member is working less on the labor market but more in household production,
i.e. is doing more shopping activities (see below). This low-skilled member is working even
less than any other group of workers in the city. These labor supply behaviors are re￿ ected
by the number of commuting trips. The high-skilled member of the heterogeneous household
commutes on average 280 times per year, i.e. he is doing 280 working shifts, which is more
than any other group of workers.15 On account of this labor division, the heterogeneous
household can lower full economic commuting cost by residing closer to the working place of
its high-wage member. As a result (see Table 5), the average two-way commuting distance
of the high-skilled member of this household type is on average lower (22.5 km), compared
to the low-skilled member (31.5 km). So, we generalize the results of White (1977),16 found
in a partial equilibrium approach, to the case of a general equilibrium model of a dispersed
urban area including spatial taste variety in shopping, endogenously determined supply of
working days and interactions between di⁄erent markets and household types.
15Based on the assumption of 220 operating days with 16 hours per day and 8 hours per working day,
theoretical number of commuting trips is 440. But this number can not be realized in practice because
each commuting trip requires travel time and total time constraint must hold.
16White found that if the wage of the better earning member (the male worker in her model) in the two-worker
household is su¢ ciently high relative to the wage of the other member, the two-worker household would be
willing to reside nearer to the work location of the better earning member (which is the city center in her
model). Then, the better earning member can reduce commuting time, even though this caused increasing
commuting time for the other member (the female with a exogenously given suburban work location) and
the payment of a premium for a central location.
27Summing up, heterogeneous two-worker households are more likely to live farther away from
the central district compared to homogeneous two-worker households.17 As can be seen in
Table 4, 10.6% of the heterogeneous two-worker households prefer residing in the city center,
which is only more preferred by homogeneous two-worker households.
In addition, specialization in shopping is another important issue arising when considering a
complex household structure. Let us consider Table 6 which presents average full economic
shopping cost (per unit, trip and person), i.e. the average full consumer price, of homogeneous
and heterogeneous two-worker households.
Table 6: Economies of scale in shopping
Average full economic shopping price per person
[$/unit/trip/person]














Heterogeneous 130.50 136.41 144.53 136.41 130.50
Because the household member with the lower value of time, i.e. the low-skilled member,
is specializing in shopping, the heterogeneous household faces lower average full economic
shopping cost than a homogeneous household with two high-skilled members. But, remember
the assumption that shopping trips within a household are imperfect substitutes. This is
the reason why even the high-wage member of the heterogenous household is doing some
shopping. As a consequence, average full economic shopping cost of this household type is
higher compared to the average full consumer price of a homogeneous household with only
17Using a Logit model, Freedman and Kern (1997) found that a wife living in a two-worker household working
full time at an uninterrupted professional career (like the husband) substantially increases the probability of
choosing a central city location compared to a two-worker household with a wife working at an interrupted
non-professional career (in contrast to the husband). However, they argued that it would be interesting
to use a general equilibrium approach to see whether the e⁄ect remains the same. In fact, our general
equilibrium approach indirectly yields the same result. Assuming that the wife working at an interrupted
non-professional career is the lower skilled (not full time working) member in the heterogeneous two-worker
household, the probability of choosing a central city location is higher for a homogeneous two-worker
household (where both members working full time at an uninterrupted professional career).
28low-skilled members. In contrast, since both members of the homogeneous household face
the same value of time, homogeneous households would not bene￿t from specialization in
shopping.18
In the following we simulate a number of cities which di⁄er in the household structure, discuss
the results and compare them to the ￿ Base City￿simulation. This provides various interesting
relationships between the household structure and the urban economy.
4 Other cities: results
The cities we consider in our simulations di⁄er in the household structure, i.e. they di⁄er in
the average household size, the composition of household types, the relative share of di⁄erent
household types and the number of households. However, the total city population as well
as the proportion of low-skilled and high-skilled persons in the city remain unchanged. This
allows us to focus on the pure e⁄ects of di⁄erences in the household structure. Table 7 gives
the household structure for the di⁄erent simulations we carried out.
Table 7: Simulation scheme
Workers living in Non-Workers living in City HH
City SW HoTW HeTW SNW CNW [million] [1]
Household [%] Household [%]
1 ￿ Singles City￿ 100 0 0 100 0 1.480 1.00
2 80 10 10 80 20 1.332 1.11
3 60 20 20 60 40 1.184 1.25
4 40 30 30 40 60 1.036 1.43
5 ￿ Base City￿ 36 30 34 33 67 1.000 1.48
6 20 40 40 20 80 0.888 1.67
7 ￿ Couples City￿ 0 50 50 0 100 0.740 2.00
Note: [1]: Average household size [Adult city residents per household]
In all simulations:
Total city population: 1,480,000 Non-working persons: 390,000
Low-skilled persons: 763,000 High-skilled persons: 327,000
18However, when modeling mode choice with di⁄erent mode availability, the value of time might di⁄er even
in a homogeneous two-worker household.
29Simulation 1 denotes the ￿ Singles City￿ , consisting only of single-person households which are
either non-working or working. In this ￿ Singles City￿the total number of households is the
highest and equals the total number of city residents, whereas average household size is the
lowest. In contrast, in the ￿ Couples City￿ , where all non-working residents live in non-working
couple households and the whole labor force lives only in two-worker households, the total
number of households is the lowest, whereas average household size is the highest. Note that
we do not consider children in our simulation. Taking children (dependents) explicitly into
account, average household size in Table 7 would be higher.
Table 8: Changes in rents, wages, prices, output, shopping
Zone 1 or 5 Zone 2 or 4 Zone 3
Rent [$/m2/year]
￿ Singles City￿ 76.46 (+9.14 %) 116.89 (+6.23 %) 165.78 (+4.08%)
￿ Couples City￿ 66.76 (-4.71%) 107.00 (-2.75%) 156.84 (-1.53%)













































Note: In parentheses: Changes in relation to ￿ Base City￿
As Table 8 shows, in the ￿ Singles City￿rents are higher everywhere, whereas in the ￿ Couples
City￿rents are lower compared to the ￿ Base City￿ . The reason for this is that economies of
scale in housing disappear (arise) when the city turns into a pure ￿ Singles City￿(￿ Couples
30City￿ ). Hence, the demand for housing increases with a growing number of singles in the city,
while the supply of developable land is perfectly inelastic.
The development of wage rates is di⁄erent with respect to the skill level. While the wage
rate for high-skilled workers increases when the city turns into a pure ￿ Singles City￿ , the wage
rate for low-skilled workers decreases signi￿cantly. This is caused by the change in urban
labor supply which is displayed in Figure 4. Note that the letters ￿ A￿or ￿ B￿in this and the
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Figure 4: Changes in urban labor supply
If more workers live in single-person households the supply of low-skilled labor, measured
in working days per year, increases but the supply of high-skilled labor decreases. The
reason is that internal labor division is not feasible for a single-person household. Therefore,
low-skilled singles work more while high-skilled singles work less compared to equivalent
individuals living in larger households. All in all in the simulations urban labor supply of low-
skilled workers rises by 33% compared to the ￿ Base City￿when the city turns into a ￿ Singles
City￿ , while labor supply of high-skilled workers drops by 16%. The maximum number of
31commutes (=working shifts) is 221 in the ￿ Singles City￿ , now realized by the lower-skilled
worker. In contrast, in the ￿ Couples City￿the maximum number of commutes (=working
shifts) is 270. Here realized by the higher-skilled worker. Moreover, there is a remarkable
increase in the urban wage di⁄erential between skill levels. The wage di⁄erential in the
city center nearly doubles from $9.31 to $18.93 when the city turns from the ￿ Couples City￿
into the ￿ Singles City￿ . As a consequence, inequality between skill groups rises remarkably.
Interestingly, the maximal number of commutes realized by a working city resident is the
highest in the ￿ Base City￿ . If there are only households with more than one member in the
city, wage di⁄erential is the lowest. Hence, the incentive for internal labor division decreases
in heterogeneous two-worker households. To sum up: the household structure a⁄ects urban
labor force participation of di⁄erently skilled workers and thus city wages (and vice versa).
Commodity prices remain almost una⁄ected. This can be explained by considering input
costs which are re￿ ected by prices. There is a strong increase in rents and high-skilled wages
when moving to the ￿ Singles City￿which is evidently o⁄set by the reduction in low-skilled
wages.
Commuting and shopping patterns are also a⁄ected by di⁄erences in the household structure.
Figure 5 depicts changes in the number of extreme cross commuters, where extreme cross
commuting is de￿ned as commuting from zone 1 (5) to Zone 5 (1), thus, crossing the whole
city. The number of commuters doing extreme cross commuting drops by 62% to almost zero
when moving from the ￿ Basic City￿to the ￿ Singles City￿ . Here, extreme cross commuters
amount to a percentage of only 1.88 of all commuters, whereas this percentage is 5.01 in the
￿ Base City￿ .19 In the ￿ Singles City￿the average two-way commuting distance is 5.2 kilometers
lower than in the ￿ Base City￿ . Consider a heterogeneous household whose joint residential
location decision takes into account work locations of both household members. Since full
economic commuting costs of the higher-skilled member exceed full economic commuting
19For comparison only, the share of workers of age 16 and higher doing extreme commuting (> 90 minutes
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Figure 5: Changes in commuting patterns
costs of the lower-skilled member, the household primarily wants to reduce the commuting
distance of the higher-skilled member. The work location of the lower-skilled member is less
important and joint household utility is less sensitive with respect to that work location.
This induces a higher extent of extreme commuting. In contrast, if there are only singles
in the city, utility is very sensitive with respect to each joint work-home location decision.
Therefore, the share of extreme commuting is smaller in the ￿ Singles City￿ . In addition, the
number of commuters doing intrazonal commuting (home zone = work zone) is by about
28% higher in the ￿ Singles City￿compared to the ￿ Base City￿ .
Changes in total commuting trips per year (total number of commutes made by all workers)
are shown in Table 9. The number of intrazonal commuting trips per year is signi￿cantly
higher in the ￿ Singles City￿ . This results from two e⁄ects: the increase in total urban labor
supply (Figure 4) and the increase in the number of intrazonal commuters (Figure 5). Con-
sequently, the average one-way commuting time of working household members is only about
18.3 minutes per day compared to 23.5 minutes in the ￿ Base City￿ . In the ￿ Couples City￿ , the
reverse pattern occurs: the number of intrazonal commuting trips per year is lower.
33Table 9: Changes in commuting trips in percent
Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 Zone 4 Zone 5
Zone 1 +28.4 (-12.6) +19.3 (-7.6) +0.6 (+0.7) -19.9 (+11.7) -33.8 (+22.3)
Zone 2 +10.2 (-1.6) +28.1 (-10.0) +15.9 (-3.5) -8.1 (+8.6) -26.5 (+17.6)
Zone 3 -13.4 (+13.9) +7.9 (+0.8) +33.0 (-10.3) +7.9 (+0.8) -13.4 (+13.9)
Zone 4 -26.5 (+17.6) -8.1 (+8.6) +15,9 (-3.5) +28.1 (-10.0) +10.2 (-1.6)
Zone 5 -33.8 (+22.3) -19.9 (+11.7) +0.6 (+0.7) +19.3 (-7.6) +28.4 (-12.6)
Note: In parentheses: ￿ Couples City￿changes in relation to ￿ Base City￿
Changes in the total number of shopping trips per year made by all city residents are shown
in Table 10.
Table 10: Changes in shopping trips in percent
Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 Zone 4 Zone 5
Zone 1 +3.6 (-1.2) +1.5 (-1.0) -1.3 (-0.5) -3.9 (-0.2) -5.9 (+0.1)
Zone 2 -3.4 (+1.1) +0.9 (+0.6) -2.0 (+1.0) -5.7 (+1.2) -8.3 (+1.4)
Zone 3 -9.2 (+2.6) -5.4 (+2.3) -0.5 (+2.0) -5.4 (+2.3) -9.2 (+2.6)
Zone 4 -8.3 (+1.4) -5.7 (+1.2) -2.0 (+1.0) +0.9 (+0.6) -3.4 (+1.1)
Zone 5 -5.9 (+0.1) -3.9 (-0.2) -1.3 (-0.3) +1.5 (-1.0) +3.6 (-1.2)
Note: In parentheses: ￿ Couples City￿changes in relation to ￿ Base City￿
Compared to the ￿ Base City￿ , the number of shopping trips originating in the city center
is smaller in the ￿ Singles City￿and larger in the ￿ Couples City￿ , re￿ ecting the centralizing
advantage the city center provides for two-worker households. Furthermore, in the ￿ Couples
City￿more shopping trips are made to stores farther away from home. Two-worker households
economize on full economic shopping costs by internal partitioning of shopping trips. This
allows them to satisfy their spatial taste variety in shopping on a larger scale. In contrast,
in the ￿ Singles City￿less trips are made to locations farther away from home. The reasons
for this are: ￿rst, economizing on full economic shopping cost is not possible because each
single person has to do shopping trips on its own; second, in the ￿ Singles City￿all low-
skilled workers live in single-person households and su⁄er from lower wages associated with
a smaller disposable income. As a consequence, in the ￿ Singles City￿monetary transport
34costs take up a large fraction of income, i.e. 10% if living in the city center and 13% if living
in zone 1 or 5. These are the highest numbers compared to all the other households in all
simulations. This lowers the willingness to purchase commodities at stores farther away from
home. Accordingly, average distance travelled for shopping decreases with an increase in the
number of single-person households.
Summarizing the impact of changes in the household structure on the spatial pattern of
commuting and shopping, we found in regard to both trip purposes: an increase in the num-
ber of single-person households ceteris paribus lowers average distance travelled by workers
(commuting) and residents (shopping). However, concerning the total distance travelled per
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Figure 6: Changes in total travelled distances
In the ￿ Couples City￿total two-way commuting distance travelled by all workers per year
is the highest (about 4,000 million kilometers). Total kilometers travelled decrease with
an increase in the number of single-person households up to the point where 40 percent
of all workers live in single-worker households (city simulation 4). One reason is that the
number of extreme cross commuters decreases with an increase in the number of single-person
households (see Figure 5). Beyond the threshold of 40% of workers living as single-persons,
the total commuting distance travelled by all workers per year increases. This in turn is
conditional on the increase in the total labor force participation (total urban labor supply)
35caused by the growth in the number of single-person households (see Figure 4). So, there
is a trade o⁄ between a decline in extreme cross commuting and a rise in the total labor
force participation. While the former is dominant if less than 40% of all workers live in
single-person households (or if more than 60 % of all workers live in larger households),
the latter dominates if more than 40% of all workers live in single-person households. As a
result, total kilometers travelled by all workers in the city are higher in the ￿ Singles City￿
as well as in the ￿ Couples City￿ , but even more in the latter. However, with respect to the
trip purpose shopping, there is no di⁄erence in the development between average and total
distance travelled. As shown on the right panel in Figure 6, the run of the curve tends
downwards, starting from the ￿ Couples City￿ .
Finally, these results are also re￿ ected by changes in average monetary commuting and shop-
ping trip costs in comparison with the ￿ Base City￿ . In the ￿ Singles City￿average monetary
commuting cost is about $1318 per worker and year which is only $3 more. Average monetary
shopping trip cost is about $1063 per resident and year which is $41 less. In the ￿Couples
City￿ average monetary commuting cost is about $1355 per worker and year and thus $40
higher. Average monetary shopping trip cost are about $1120 per resident and year, which
is $16 more than in the ￿ Base City￿ .
5 Robustness: sensitivity analyses
In addition to the simulations discussed above (base case) Figure 4 and the subsequent Figure
5 also depict some results of the sensitivity analyses we performed (see Appendix A for
sensitivity analyses A and B). We varied some parameters determining individual behavior:
the parameter determining the taste for spatial variety in shopping, ￿; the parameter a⁄ecting
the distribution of shopping activities in larger households, !; the parameter determining the
preference to spread leisure over both household members, ￿; and the parameter ￿ which
re￿ ects the taste heterogeneity concerning a speci￿c location choice set.
36In sensitivity analysis A, parameter values are lowered (￿ = 0:1, ! = 0:2, ￿ = ￿0:5, ￿ = 5).
This implies that responses to prices are less important while taste heterogeneity becomes
more important. Hence, deterministic utility becomes less important and the probability to
choose a speci￿c location is less sensitive to economic e⁄ects. An alternative interpretation
is that more households are willing to accept a location choice set associated with a lower de-
terministic utility level, because stronger "hidden" tastes make this location more preferable
compared to other locations.
In sensitivity analysis B, parameters in￿ uencing responses to prices are increased compared to
the base case (￿ = 0:9, ! = 0:99, ￿ = 0:5, ￿ = 15). Therefore, price based behavior becomes
more important in relation to taste heterogeneity. Hence, deterministic utility components
become more important and the probability to choose a speci￿c location is more sensitive to
economic e⁄ects.
Performing sensitivity analyses A and B hardly a⁄ects the results qualitatively concerning
changes in urban labor supply (see Figure 4), commuting patterns (see Figure 5) as well as
commuting and shopping trips (see Appendix A) found in the base case. There are only
some changes in the magnitude of e⁄ects. This suggests that the e⁄ects of changes in the
household structure are robust with respect to changes in parameters of individual behavior.
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Figure 7: Changes in total travelled distances (Sensitivity analysis)
37In sensitivity analysis A, the reversal in total commuting distance travelled by all city workers
occurring when moving to the ￿ Singles City￿is strengthened. Since in this simulation house-
holds location choice is less responsive to changes in the household structure, households
do not relocate to reduce full economic commuting costs. Hence, cross commuting declines
much less than in the base case. Instead, the increase in total urban labor supply dominates
and thus the aggregate travel distances increase to the left of the ￿ Base City￿(see the left
panel in Figure 7). In contrast, in sensitivity analysis B, the number of commuters doing
extreme cross commuting as well as the number of extreme commuting trips drop much more
when more city workers live in single-person households. Since this is dominant the total
commuting distance falls almost continuously when moving to the ￿ Singles City￿ .
Regarding shopping costs, the run of the curve of total shopping distances travelled by all city
residents per year is basically the same in sensitivity analyses A and B. However, the decrease
is less strong in simulation A. In the ￿ Base City￿of sensitivity analysis A, both household
members want doing shopping trips due to a strong taste for splitting shopping trips. Hence,
the e⁄ect of economizing on full economic shopping cost is less strong. When more residents
live in single-person households, the only household member is also doing shopping trips on
its own. In sensitivity analysis B, the incentive to reduce travelling concerning shopping
is even larger than in the base case implying a reduction in total shopping trip distances
travelled per year by all residents.
6 Model extensions, applications and conclusions
We have analyzed the impacts of changes in the household structure on an urban economy by
applying an urban model which explicitly considers a complex household structure. Besides
the usually assumed single-worker household, we have implemented non-working single and
couple households as well as homogeneous and heterogeneous two-worker households. The
households di⁄er not only in endowments and preferences, but also in size and the composition
regarding their members. We found that ￿rst, changes in the household structure ceteris
38paribus a⁄ect a city in various ways and second, the impacts of such changes are closely
linked and interdependent.
Changing the urban household structure a⁄ects the labor force participation. Urban labor
supply of lower-skilled workers increases while labor supply of higher-skilled workers decreases
when the number of single-person households rises in the city, associated with a remarkable
increase in the urban wage di⁄erential. Indeed, an increase in wage inequality has been a
feature of the U.S. labor market for decades. As has been demonstrated, changes in the
household structure can also contribute to wage inequality within an urban economy.
Furthermore, housing demand and rents in the city are key features of the e⁄ects of changes
in the household structure. Housing demand increases with in an increase in the number of
single-person households implying rising city rents. The reason for this is that economies of
scale in housing cannot be realized in smaller households. Hence, overall housing demand
increases substantially when moving to a ￿ Singles City￿ . Rent changes are stronger in the
suburbs (see Table 8), re￿ ecting the fact that the centralizing e⁄ect of the city center becomes
less important when more city residents live as single persons. Indeed, in the U.S., smaller
household types traditionally associated with more central residential locations are becoming
more increasingly common in suburbs (Center on Urban & Metropolitan Policy, 2002).
In addition, urban commuting and shopping patterns depend on household structure. Ex-
treme cross commuting drops, while intrazonal commuting rises when more workers live
alone. This ceteris paribus results in lower average commuting distances travelled. Moreover,
in cities with a higher number of single-person households less trips are made to shopping
locations farther away from home.
However, there is some evidence that average commuting time and distance have not de-
creased over the last decades, although average household size did decline. This suggests
that, besides the household structure, there are further e⁄ects in￿ uencing average commut-
ing time and distance. For instance, it would be interesting to see whether considering a
variable city size would increase average commuting time and distance, although average
39household size in the city decreases.
Implementing such a di⁄erentiated household structure allows studying a broad range of
further urban economic issues. The model could be applied to various policies that arise in
today￿ s cities. However, some issues can only be examined in the case of appropriate model
extensions. For instance, trip chaining is ignored in this model version, as in most urban
models so far, except for Anas (2007). But, especially in the case of two-worker households,
trip chaining can increase household utility. Assuming that both household members are
employed at di⁄erent locations. Then, they can satisfy their love for spatial product variety
by shopping trips that directly originate at work location. Or, travel times can be modeled
such that they depend on tra¢ c volume (see Anas and Xu, 1999). The implementation of
mode choice would allow considering mode availability within households. This can in￿ uence
full economic commuting and shopping costs. As a result, for instance, location decisions,
commuting and shopping patterns and labor supply decisions of household members can di⁄er
due to di⁄erences in full economic travel costs, even in homogeneous two-worker households.
In addition, the modeling of children o⁄ers the opportunity to examine various interesting
issues. Children in￿ uence labor force participation of parents and, probably also the location
decision of the household (see e.g. Sermons and Koppelman, 2001). For instance, the loca-
tions of private schools and child care facilities might in￿ uence the joint residential as well
as the work location decision of household members in the urban area. Assuming children in
the household, the low-skilled member of a heterogeneous two-worker household might even
commute shorter distances on average due to household responsibilities.
Furthermore, due to the fact that income tax schemes treat di⁄erent households di⁄erently,
the e⁄ects of national or, if there is tax autonomy, of local ￿scal policies on an urban economy
can be examined by implementing taxation. Since wages are endogenously determined in the
model, income tax rates can in￿ uence labor decisions and thus wages in the city. This in
turn can a⁄ect location decisions. These and further aspects are left for future work.
40Appendix-A: Sensitivity Analysis






SNW CNW SW 8h HoTW 8h HeTW
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
- 0.2 - 0.2 0.2
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Price [$/unit] 102.91 113.64 125.00 113.64 102.91
Output/resident [units] 39.29 36.80 33.79 36.80 39.29














Location decision [% HH of HH-Type y]
SNW 28.0 16.8 10.4 16.8 28.0



























HeTW 24.6 18.7 13.4 18.7 24.6
Income [$/year] Housing [lot size m2]
SNW 21,531 38 - 114















HeTW 50,626 - 54,484 102 - 284






SNW CNW SW 8h HoTW 8h HeTW
0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
- 0.99 ￿ 0.99 0.99
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
15 15 15 15 15
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Price [$/unit] 115.43 120.32 125.00 120.32 115.43
Output/resident [units] 48.59 37.87 29.28 37.87 48.59














Location decision [% HH of HH-Type y]
SNW 32.7 14.0 6.6 14.0 32.7



























HeTW 28.5 16.8 9.4 16.8 28.5
Income [$/year] Housing [lot size m2]
SNW 24,934 54 - 96















HeTW 58,230 - 58,683 131 - 236
IIITable 13: Changes in rents, wages, prices, output, shopping - Sensitivity analysis A
Zone 1 or 5 Zone 2 or 4 Zone 3
Rent [$/m2/year]
￿ Singles City￿ 65.74 (+11.05%) 116.07 (+8.04%) 186.86 (+5.70%)
￿ Couples City￿ 56.44 (-4.66%) 104.15 (-3.05%) 173.35 (-1.94%)













































Note: In parentheses: Changes in relation to ￿ Base City￿of sensitivity analysis A
IVTable 14: Changes in rents, wages, prices, output, shopping - Sensitivity analysis B
Zone 1 or 5 Zone 2 or 4 Zone 3
Rent [$/m2/year]
￿ Singles City￿ 87.68 (+7.97%) 117.54 (+5.07%) 150.14 (+3.36%)
￿ Couples City￿ 77.48 (-4.59%) 108.89 (-2.66%) 143.05 (-1.52%)













































Note: In parentheses: Changes in relation to ￿ Base City￿of sensitivity analysis B
VChanges in commuting trips [%] in relation to ￿ Base City￿of sensitivity analysis A
Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 Zone 4 Zone 5
Zone 1 +25.7 (-12.7) +18.3 (-8.4) +7.4 (-1.9) -3.0 (+5.2) -10.8 (+10.9)
Zone 2 +13.6 (-5.0) +20.1 (-8.2) +12.5 (-4.0) +1.0 (+2.7) -7.8 (+8.6)
Zone 3 -1.6 (+4.3) +8.3 (-1.2) +19.2 (-6.7) +8.3 (-1.2) -1.6 (+4.3)
Zone 4 -7.8 (+8.6) +1.0 (+2.7) +12.5 (-4.0) +20.1 (-8.2) +13.6 (-5.0)
Zone 5 -10.8 (+10.9) -3.0 (+5.2) +7.4 (-1.9) +18.3 (-8.4) +25.7 (-12.7)
Note: In parentheses: ￿ Couples City￿changes in relation to ￿ Base City￿of sensitivity analysis A
Changes in commuting trips [%] in relation to ￿ Base City￿of sensitivity analysis B
Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 Zone 4 Zone 5
Zone 1 +26.2 (-12.0) +13.5 (-5.4) -12.6 (+6.7) -35.9 (+23.5) -47.9 (+38.9)
Zone 2 +5.1 (+1.0) +32.1 (-11.4) +13.1 (-2.7) -21.0 (+12.4) -41.5 (+27.3)
Zone 3 -25.4 (+18.5) +4.3 (+1.8) +43.6 (-13.7) +4.3 (+1.8) -25.4 (+18.5)
Zone 4 -41.5 (+27.3) -21.0 (+12.4) +13.1 (-2.7) +32.1 (-11.4) +5.1 (+1.0)
Zone 5 -47.9 (+38.9) -35.9 (+23.5) -12.6 (+6.7) +13.5 (-5.4) +26.2 (-12.0)
Note: In parentheses: ￿ Couples City￿changes in relation to ￿ Base City￿of sensitivity analysis B
Changes in shopping trips [%] in relation to ￿ Base City￿of sensitivity analysis A
Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 Zone 4 Zone 5
Zone 1 +2.1 (-0.7) +2.1 (-0.9) +1.8 (-0.9) +0.8 (-0.6) -0.1 (-0.3)
Zone 2 -1.9 (+1.2) -0.7 (+0.7) -0.9 (+0.7) -2.0 (+1.0) -3.1 (+1.4)
Zone 3 -5.5 (+2.7) -4.2 (+2.2) -3.0 (+1.8) -4.2 (+2.2) -5.5 (+2.7)
Zone 4 -3.1 (+1.4) -2.0 (+1.0) -0.9 (+0.7) -0.7 (+0.7) -1.9 (+1.2)
Zone 5 -0.1 (-0.3) +0.8 (-0.6) +1.8 (-0.9) +2.1 (-0.9) +2.1 (-0.7)
Note: In parentheses: ￿ Couples City￿changes in relation to ￿ Base City￿of sensitivity analysis A
Changes in shopping trips [%] in relation to ￿ Base City￿of sensitivity analysis B
Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 Zone 4 Zone 5
Zone 1 +3.8 (-1.9) -3.9 (+0.4) -10.4 (+2.9) -10.5 (+2.1) -9.5 (+1.4)
Zone 2 -7.9 (+0.3) +4.9 (+0.0) -6.7 (+2.5) -12.4 (+1.5) -13.3 (+0.5)
Zone 3 -14.9 (+0.5) -8.5 (+1.3) +7.1 (+1.5) -8.5 (+1.3) -14.9 (+0.5)
Zone 4 -13.3 (+0.5) -12.4 (+1.5) -6.7 (+2.5) +4.9 (+0.0) -7.9 (+0.3)
Zone 5 -9.5 (+1.4) -10.5 (+2.1) -10.4 (+2.9) -3.9 (+0.4) +3.8 (-1.9)
Note: In parentheses: ￿ Couples City￿changes in relation to ￿ Base City￿of sensitivity analysis B
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